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The  European  Idea 
and  the  Resistance  Movement 
Many people do  not realize what a strong influence  the  resistance  movement 
of the second world war had on the  formulation  of the idea of a United Europe. 
This  article  by  Henri  Brugmans,  now  Rector  of the  College  of Europe  and  a 
great European federalist,  formerly  a member of the Dutch resistance movement, 
is  a  personal  statement  on the  influence  of the  resistance  movement in  various 
countries  on the  idea  of a  United  Europe. 
National "faith" declined 
In the  beginning  of  the  20th  century,  the  tradi-
tional symbols  of Nationalism were  still  revered as 
"holy". The national anthems still sounded credible: 
in the Marseillaise,  the love for  the fatherland  was 
called  "sacred",  and  the  Germans  were  invited  to 
believe that their country should be held "above all 
the world'~. But in 1940, there wasnoFrenchpatriotic 
upheaval,  no  taxis  de  Ia  Marne,  and  the  appeals 
to resist the Boches sounded antiquated. As  for  the 
Nazis,  their "faith" was  ideological rather than na-
tional in the old 19th century-sense of the word. Both 
Britain and Germany crusading for  an idea,  rather 
than  defending  a  territory.  As  Edith  Cavell  had 
already  said  in  1916:  "Patriotism  was  no  longer 
enough." 
This was particularly true for the occupied coun-
tries  on the Continent,  where  the  national flag  was 
used  both  by  collaborators  with  the  Nazis  and 
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underground-workers.  In  1914,  the  Kaiser  had de-
clared that "he no longer knew parties but only Ger-
mans". A quarter of a century later, a Dutch resister 
would spit on "his" national flag  when used by the 
Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, since it had been 
degraded by the triangle of "the Movement". And in 
1941, when Syria was invaded by the Allies, Gaullists 
and Vichy-French killed each other under the com-
mon tricolore. In short, the national idea had ceased 
to  be  a  crystallization-point for  compatriots,  what-
ever their political or confessional conviction. Indeed, 
it was  interpreted in the  most contrasting  ways.  It 
had become a sign of contradiction. 
European solidarity on both sides 
By  contrast,  a  feeling  of  European  togetherness 
grew  on both sides  of the barricade. In Russia, the 
"European  S.S."  fought  "Asiatic  Bolshevism"  and claimed to defend the spiritual values of a common 
civilization rather than one single country, Germany. 
Of course,  the language of command was  German 
but  in  the  "Black  Corps"  one  found  Frenchme~ 
(such as Jacques Doriot, who  had been a  leader of 
the  Communist  Youth)  and Belgians  (such  as  the 
leader of the Rexists, Degrelle), Slovaks and Croats 
L~thuanians  and  Dutchmen;  they  stood  togethe; 
With  the Spanish "division azul", with Hungarians, 
Rumanians  and Italians  who  were  supposed  to  be 
Fascists.  A  new  Europe,  they  were  told,  was  to 
arise  from  their  struggle,  a  Europe  based  on  the 
sound principles of nationhood, but united under the 
banner  of  the  strongest  nation  of  all,  Germany. 
"'Germany  fights  for  Europe":  on the  walls  of  the 
occupied countries, this slogan appeared as  the war 
dragged on-even if a native added a little counter-
slogan:  "Don't take  the  trouble  for  me".  In Nazi 
propaganda, "Europe" was everywhere, but it was a 
"'Europe" of a very specific sort. 
On the  other hand,  there  was  a  certain  amount 
of risk involved in listening  to  the jammed broad-
casting  of  the  BBC  especially  when  all  sets  were 
supposed to have been handed over to the German 
~uthorities in  1944,  but those  who  listened  exper-
Ienced a  feeling  of immediate, militant brotherhood 
when they  heard  about the  work of the  resistance 
abroad.~ bridge blown up in Yugoslavia, a convoy 
attacked m  the woods  of Poland, the swastika flag 
~eplaced by  the national flag  on the Acropolis,  be 
It only for a  few  hours, a daring operation in Hol-
land in order to free  some political prisoners from 
~oal, the  German-controlled  Soir in  Brussels  pub-
lished  for  once  as  a  truly  patriotic  paper,  Italian 
partisans  ~ghting  in  the  Alps-we  felt  sympathy 
for  all  this-on  whatever  side  of  a  frontier  one 
happened to  be.  Patriotism, like Nazism, gained an 
European dimension. 
Planning for the future 
Some  members  of  the  resistance  movement  did 
not give much thought to what was to happen after 
Hitler's  defeat.  The main  task was  to  liberate  the 
country, to help the Allies in every respect, to revive 
the  spirit of resistance.  They  did intelligence-work, 
published clandestine papers, organized hiding-places 
for  the  menaced Jews  (as  in Anne Frank's diary); 
they set up a network of places where Allied airmen 
would be looked after and sent to Spain or Switzer-
land, collected weapons for the great days  to come, 
created  professional  groups  of  doctors,  teachers, 
churchmen, civil servants, who could take action as 
soon as the enemy tried to infiltrate their profession. 
Most  of  them  had  hardly  any  time  or energy  to 
spare apart from those tasks. Their goal was libera-
tion.  One  would  think  of  the  rest  when  the  war 
was  over and the fatherland free  again.  There were 
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undoubtedly  differences  of  opmwn  between  com-
rades-in-arms, but they could not afford  to discuss 
them at the time. 
However,  as  victory  came  nearer,  the  need  for 
planning became more and more apparent. There was 
a  reluctance  to  accept  that this  tremendous  ordeal 
would just lead to  a  return to  the status quo ante. 
We  had witnessed the utter collapse of our national 
State-system. Shameful Vichy-type collaboration and 
the  wide-spread  cowardice  of  so  many  had proved 
that something was rotten in our national communi-
ties. Above all: what could we do in order to prevent 
a  return  of  this  tragedy?  Specifically:  what  would 
be the fate  of Germany after her defeat?  "Uncond-
itional surrender" was the watchword that came out 
of  Casablanca.  But that would  lay  the  whole  res-
ponsibility on the shoulders of the victorious powers. 
Were they prepared for that task too? Many under-
ground figures  had their  doubts,  since  the  Atlantic 
Charter  had  hardly  offered  any  new  perspectives. 
Admittedly, the League of Nations was to be restor-
ed and renamed the "United Nations", but it seemed 
as if UNO might be as "toothless" as its predecessor 
in Geneva had been. Some original thinking had to be 
done  under  occupation,  since  the  Western  Allies 
seemed to lack constructive imagination. 
The German Resistance 
In  the  occupied  countries,  resistance  was  com-
paratively  easy.  One  took  some  physical  risk  but 
politically  and  morally,  the  situation  was  clear 
enough.  The  Petain  regime  obscured  the  issue  in 
France, but elsewhere  primitive  patriotism inspired 
resisters. In Germany, however, the roles were revers-
ed:  to oppose Nazism during the war meant hardly 
less  then high treason,  and those  who  planned the 
Fuhrer's violent death in the plot of July 20  could 
be  accused  of  stabbing  their  country  in  the  back. 
Consequently,  it  required  an  exceptional  amount 
of  moral  courage  to  resist  the  tyrant  in  his  own 
realm at a moment of national emergency. Some did 
however accept the consequences of their own ideas: 
most of them were Christians and Social Democrats. 
They  first  opposed  Hitler  on  the  ground  that  he 
was  anti-Christ,  usurper  of the  title  of  "saviour". 
The second group believed in a democratic "Rechts-
staat" (state of law), where the fundamental human 
rights  would  be  upheld  and  democracy  fulfilled 
through  Socialism.  Two  names  spring  to  mind: 
Dietrich  Bonhoeffer  and  Carlo  Mierendorff.  They 
received some support from army officers and found 
their main political leader in the former  Mayor of 
Leipzig,  Dr. Goerdeler.  They went  the  whole  way, 
finally  trying  to  establish  contact  with  the  outside 
world-with  the  "enemy"-in  order  to  stop  the 
slaughter and create  a  new European order. 
For  Goerdeler  this  had  been  the  result  of  a painful evolution.  Admittedly, he  had opposed Na-
zism from the beginning, but as a conservative patriot 
he  had attempted  to  avoid  total  collapse  for  Ger-
many.  He  proposed  peace-terms  that  might  be 
acceptable for  his  country,  and wished  to  negotiate 
them with London and Washington on a  power-to-
power  basis.  This  project  failed.  In  spite  of  the 
efforts made by Dr Visser 't Hooft, secretary-general 
of the  World  Council  of  Churches  in  Geneva,  and 
Bishop Bell of Chichester, the Western governments 
ignored these SOS  calls inside the Third Reich, and 
decided in favour of "unconditional surrender", thus 
giving  Herr  Goebbels  an  unhoped-for  propaganda 
theme. 
Since it had become clear that a negotiated peace-
treaty was  out of the question, Goerdeler's political 
hopes centred more and more round European Fede-
ralism.  If total  capitulation  was  inevitable,  what 
would  happen afterwards?  The foreign  programme 
of the German Resistance suggested the creation of 
a  United States  of  Europe,  with  a  single  economy 
and joint defence. It laid great emphasis  upon this 
last  point,  since  anti-communism  had  become  one 
of the main themes of the resisters. Was not the Red 
Army steadily advancing towards the West?  Where 
was  it  going  to  stop?  Could  the  Western  Allies 
wish to  see  Germany tum Bolshevik? 
Resistance movements in France and elsewhere 
Outside Germany, the political programme of the 
resistance movements can be divided into four main 
groups.  On  the  one  hand,  the  political  "neutrals" 
we mentioned above. On the other, among the poli-
tically conscious and active fighters:  the Communists 
on the Left, the traditional Patriots on the Right, and 
the Socialists of every shade somewhere in the Cen-
tre. 
The  communist  parties,  mentally  well  equipped 
for underground work, joined the bulk of the Resis-
tance  mainly  after  the  attack  on the  Soviet  Union. 
But already  before  that  date,  in  June  1941,  some 
of  their  rank  and  file  had  gone  into  action,  in 
spite of the fact that Stalin still considered the Russo-
German friendship treaty as valid and any anti-Nazi 
movement  consequently  as  harmful.  For  example, 
when  the  Amsterdam  dockers  went  on  strike  in 
February 1941, as a protest against the beginning of 
the  persecution  of  the  Jews  (about  85,000  in  the 
Dutch  capital)  there  was  a  spontaneous  rising  in 
which many Communists participated, without wait-
ing for instructions. In fact, it is fair to say that the 
Communist-led sector of the underground movement 
was  psychologically different from  the  official  party 
leadership  which  often  kept  itself  in  reserve  for 
better  times  to  come,  leaving  the  risks  to  others. 
The traditional Patriots, for their part, had become 
more and more nation-conscious.  Their hatred,  not 
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only  of  Nazis  but  of  Germans  as  such,  grew  as 
the struggle became more tense. Actually, they came 
closer and closer to the non-political group. 
The  democratic  Socialists,  by  contrast,  were 
strongly  pro-European.  A  German  historian,  pro-
fessor  Walter Lipgens  has  counted as  many as  300 
Federalist  manifestoes,  in  the  French  underground 
papers  only.  In their  view,  the  old,  mainly  verbal 
"'Internationalism"  had  had  its  day  and  the  time 
had come  to  find  a  synthesis  between  what  could 
be retained  of  the  national  heritage  and what was 
progressive  in the  idea  of  supranationality.  If no 
new Europe was  born from  the war, it would have 
been fought in vain. Integration and federalism beca-
me  the  catch words.  As  a  Dutch clandestine paper 
put  it:  "'This  war  is  the  agony  of  the  sovereign 
Nation-State as  we  have known it in the  19th cen-
tury." Similar affirmations  were  to  be found  in the 
other occupied countries. 
The Italians: Ventotene 
One resistance  movement found itself in a  privi-
leged  position,  if  one  can say  so:  the  Italian anti-
fascist  network. It had been severely  persecuted by 
the  secret  police,  the  ill-famed  OVRA, but it had 
been able to survive in spite of heavy losses.  More-
over, there was a clear difference between the confini 
of  Mussolini  and  the  concentration  camps  Hitler 
organized. In Italy's Tyrrhenian islands, the situation 
was  somewhat  similar  to  what  political  prisoners 
had experienced in Siberia in the later days of Rus-
sian Tsarism.  One  could communicate with fellow-
prisoners,  receive  books,  write-even  marry.  Con-
sequently,  when  the  mom·ent  came  in  July  1943 
and the Duce fell, a short period of freedom began, 
for  which  many  anti-fascists  were  relatively  well 
prepared. True, a few weeks later, the German troops 
had reconquered the peninsula, but during the "fifty 
days" when Italy was  again breathing the fresh  air 
of democracy, the first European Federalist pamph-
lets  were  officially  circulated and a  congress  called 
in  Milan. 
The most  important of  these  brochures  was  the 
famous manifesto of Ventotene; the name was deriv-
ed from  the  island where  it had  been prepared by 
such men as  Ernesto Rossi  and, even more impor-
tant,  Altiero  Spinelli,  who  was  to  become  Nenni's 
chief adviser on European affairs  when  he  became 
foreign secretary many years later. Spinelli had been 
imprisoned for no less than 17 years. He had entered 
as  a young Communist; he left it a convinced Fede-
ralist  and democrat;  he  immediately  started  work-
ing  and  organizing,  trying  to  rally  all  democratic 
anti-fascists-Socialists,  Liberals,  Christian  Demo-
crats, and members of the short-lived Partito d'Azio-
ne-around  the  European  banner.  A  few  months 
later, when Mussolini had been freed from his prison and had been made the president of a puppet repub-
lic in the North, civil war broke out and Federalism 
became one of the main focus-points in the political 
aspirations  of the  partigiani. 
Geneva, 1944 
July 1944 seemed to be the decisive moment. The 
landing in Normandy had succeeded, and the German 
armies were retreating everywhere. It was high time 
to  launch a  new  movement, a  new  hope, this  time 
on a plurinational scale. Wherever they marched in, 
the  Russians  found  their  Communist friends  wait-
ing for them, ready to do whatever they were asked 
for. On the Western side, no perspective was opened, 
no programme proposed, at least not from the official 
governments who still toyed with the idea of reach-
ing  an agreement with Stalin...  whose  only aspira-
tion  was  to  paralyse  any  Anglo-American  initia-
tive. 
With  victory  around  the  comer  and  the  West 
politically sterile,  a  small  band of resistance group 
leaders decided to send some of their representatives 
to an international meeting in Geneva. France, Italy, 
Norway,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia 
were  present,  and  so  were  some  "militants"  from 
Germany.  The Federalists  deserve  great  credit  for 
having welcomed German comrades to their session, 
when the war was  still raging bitterly.  By contrast, 
the  Social  Democrat  parties  made  no  attempt  to 
re-build  their  International  until  December  1947, 
when Comisco was formed at Antwerp  ... and similar 
such moves  came  even  later for  the  other  parties. 
The final  manifesto was  the  product of a  series 
of preliminary meetings,  in which  the  Italians  had 
been  the  most active.  The spirit of Ventotene  can 
be felt  throughout the document, as  one can easily 
judge from  a  paragraph like this one: 
"Peace  in  Europe  is  the  cornerstone  of  world 
peace.  In the course of one generation,  Europe  has 
been  the  centre  of two  world  conflicts,  the  origin 
of which  is  the  existence  on  this  continent  of 30 
sovereign states. This anarchy must be cured by the 
creation  of a  federal  Union  between  the  European 
peoples. 
Only  a  federal  Union  will  allow  the  German 
people to participate in Europe's life, without becom-
ing a danger for  the other peoples. 
Only a federal  Union  will  permit solution of the 
problems  raised  by  the  frontiers  running  through 
regions with mixed population; which will thus cease 
to  be  the  object  of enraged  nationalist  desire  and 
become  simple  questions of territorial  delimitation 
for  administrative convenience. 
Only a federal  Union will permit the safeguarding 
of democratic institutions, and thus prevent countries 
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with insufficient political maturity from  endangering 
the general order. 
Only  a  federal  Union  will  allow  the  economic 
reconstruction of the  continent  and the  suppression 
of monopolies and national autarchies. 
Only a  federal  Union  will allow  the  logical  and 
natural  solution  of the  problems  of access  to  the 
sea  for  countries located in  the  centre of the conti-
nent,  of a  rational  use  of rivers  which  go  through 
different  states,  of control  of the  straits  and,  gen-
erally speaking, of most problems which have trou-
bled  international  relations  in  the  course  of these 
last  years". 
For a  document issued  in  1944,  this  declaration 
is  remarkably  sensible  and practical. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion,  it can be  said  that the  European 
idea has  offered  the  only  really  dynamic  and con-
structive prospect for the future. It came out of the 
resistance-movement as spontaneously as the Socialist 
idea  came  out  of  the  Labour  movement.  It 
claimed to be-and, in fact was-a concrete answer 
to the problems which the post-war period was going 
to  put  before  the  Europeans.  Admittedly,  it  has 
not yet reached fruition, but no alternative has been 
put forward  so  far. 
In some form or another, the ancient and proud 
nations of Europe can only pool their sovereignties 
in so  far as  they can be assured that their cultural 
identity is  safe. This is  exactly what the Federalists 
of the European underground promised. The cultural 
diversity of our continent does not depend on nation-
al customs-officers, national fighting forces,  national 
diplomacies. Those who worked for national libera-
tion  and,  at the  same time,  for  renovation  of our 
structures, believed that Federalism was the answer: 
union in diversity. 
Their message, I  trust, is  still valid. 
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The  daily  press 
in  the  European 
and  in  Britain 
Communities 
Forty-six  million  copies:  this  is,  approximately,  the  total  circulation  of  all  the  daily 
papers appearing in  the  European Community. 
That  is,  249  copies  per  1,000  head  of population,  placing  it above  the  world  average, 
estimated  at 100  copies  per  1  ,000,  but  behind  Great  Britain  and  Sweden  where  the  figure 
is  almost  twice  as  high--490  copies  per  1,000-and also  Japan,  with  476  copies  per  1,000 
head of population. 
Extreme  care  should,  however,  be  exercised  in  evaluating  such  figures.  Even  within  the 
Europe of the Six,  the situation is  far  from  being the  same from  country to country. 
I.  Daily papers 
in  the European  Community 
Circulation  (Estimated figures  1970) 
Total circulation  per  1 000  head 
No.  of  copies  of  population 
Germany  21,000,000  349 
Belgium  2,700,000  281 
France  12,500,000  251 
Italy  6,000,000  114 
Luxembourg  150,000  445 
Netherlands  3,700,000  297 
Total  46,050,000  249 
While  the  Grand-Duchy  of Luxembourg  has  a  circula-
tion  of 445  copies  per  1,000  head  of population,  placing 
it almost on a  level  with  Japan, Italy on the  other  hand, 
produces only 114  copies per 1,000 head of population, i.e. 
scarcely  more than the world average.  The circulations  of 
the  other  four  EEC  countries  are  between  251  and  349 
copies per 1,000 head of population. 
A somewhat hasty observer might suppose the European 
average  (249)  copies  to  be  comparatively  satisfactory.  But 
there is at present a  crisis in the European press. 
In search of a function 
The daily  press  is  at present rethinking its  role  in view 
of the rise of the other media-radio and television. It may 
seem  obvious  that  the  function,  or at any  rate  the  main 
function,  of  the  press  is  to  inform.  But  the  fact  is  that 
today  radio  and  television  also  inform  and  often  much 
more  quickly.  The  main  news  is  known  to  the  public 
before the daily papers have a  chance to  print them. 
The  daily  paper  must  therefore  look  for  another  role; 
it might,  for example, seek  to  provide  background inform-
ation and data to help  the  reader to place  events  in their 
context  and  to  help  him  to  form  his  own  judgment.  A 
noble  task,  no  doubt,  but  one  in  which  few  journalists 
excell  because  they  are  often  too  close  to the  events  they 
have to  write  about.  Moreover if a  newspaper  adopts this 
role it has  to compete with periodicals  most of which are 
better equipped to  produce this kind of writing. 
Moreover,  the daily  paper is  also  a  business  enterprise. 
It  may  therefore  be  dangerous  for  it  to  voice  opinions 
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too openly which may run the risk  of displeasing not only 
current  readers,  but  also  prospective  readers  and  adver-
tisers.  It is  a striking fact that within the Common Market, 
the Benelux countries are the only  ones  where the majority 
of  dailies  openly  represent  the  opinions  of  political  or 
religious groups. 
Some  papers-such as  those  known  in  Germany  as  the 
'Boulevard  or  asphalt  press'  (papers  in  large  towns  with 
enormous  circulations)-have  given  up  dealing  with  big 
news.  They rely  on a  dramatic  presentation  of events  and 
sensationalism.  Other  papers  have  begun  to  concentrate 
more-if not entirely-on what might be called small news, 
local or regional news,  and on a  kind of current informa-
tion  service  on  matters  of  daily  interest,  and  on  articles 
written  for  their  entertainment  value.  This  kind  of paper 
is  proliferating in Italy.  Here it is  the national daily which 
finds  itself in a vulnerable position. It has to decide wheth-
er  it  intends  if  possible  to  remain  a  national  paper  or 
whether,  in aspiring also  to carry regional news, it clashes 
with the interests  of specifically  regional papers which are 
becoming  increasingly important. 
The phenomenon of regionalisation 
The phenomenon of the regionalisation of the daily press 
is so important that it deserves closer scrutiny. 
In Germany, where there are 467  papers, only one paper 
with  a  national  circulation  is  sold  on  the  streets,  Bild-
Zeitung,  consisting  mainly  of small  news-items  and  sensa-
tional stories.  It prints  more than 4  million copies,  but in 
nine separate editions each adapted to  the region in which 
it  is  distributed.  Only  three  'quality'  newspapers,  sold 
mainly  on subscription,  can  be  regarded  as  having  a  na-
tional readership:  the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  Die 
Welt  and  Die  Suddeutsche  Zeitung.  All  three  together 
have a  circulation  of  the order of 800,000  copies. 
In  France,  more  than  70 % of  the  total  circulation  is 
accounted for  by  regional  dailies.  The large circulation of 
some  of  the  Paris  dailies-such  as  France-Soir-and  the 
international  reputation  of  others-such  as  Le  Monde-
should  not  be  allowed  to  obscure  the  fact  that,  taken 
together,  only  some  31  %  of  their  circulation  is  outside 
the  Paris  region;  beyond  this  area  they  scarcely  do  more 
than supplement the large  regional  papers. 
In  Italy,  a  good  part  of  the  total  daily  circulation  is 
concentrated entirely in Rome and Milan but a good many 
regional papers are to be found, printed in these two towns 
or  elsewhere.  They are very  unevenly  distributed  between 
the  regions  as  newspaper  reading  habits  vary  appreciably 
in this  country  according  to  whether  one  is  in  the  North 
or the South. In the  Benelux  countries,  the  Netherlands  is  no  doubt 
the  country  which  has  the  highest  proportion  of  papers 
with  a  genuinely  national  readership,  though  here  again 
there  are  numerous  regional  papers.  In  Belgium,  even  in 
the case  of the  largest  papers,  the  linguistic  division  is  a 
factor  in  limiting  readership  to  specific  areas.  The  Lux-
embourg  press  is  essentially  regional  if  we  consider  the 
small area it covers. 
Thus  the  big  dailies,  which  still  have  or would  like  to 
have a  national if not international readership, hemmed in 
between radio and television on the one hand and between 
periodicals  and  specifically  regional  papers  on  the  other, 
are becoming rare. Moreover they are in many cases  being 
led  to  make  changes  which  may  even  place  in  question 
certain  ideas  which  were  until  recently  regarded  as  fun-
damental. 
The economics of the newspaper business 
The  press,  as  we  have  already  said,  is  also  a  business 
enterprise. In other words,  the daily paper is  a  commodity 
that has to  be manufactured and sold. 
The  process  of  manufacture  combines  a  number  of 
highly disparate elements. One of these elements is obvious-
ly  the  information  itself.  The  journalist  who  has  to  deal 
with  it  depends  to  a  greater  and  greater  extent,  at  least 
as  regards  big  national  or international  news,  on  an  im-
portant intermediary: the news press agency. Agencies, such 
as  Reuters,  with  a  world-wide  news  coverage,  can  be 
counted on the fingers  of one hand. 
Once  the  information  is  available,  the  next  stage  is 
editing.  The  part  played  by  editing  will  obviously  vary 
according  to  the  type  of daily;  it may  range  from  selec-
tion of news and choice of headlines to the composition of 
a  more or less  thorough commentary.  In any  event,  while 
editing  plays  an  essential  part,  it  is  by  no  means  the 
heaviest  item  in  the  daily  paper's  budget  in  the  EEC 
countries:  20 % of the cost price seems  at present to  con-
stitute a  maximum and the average is  often far below this 
figure. 
Since,  in  the  last  resort,  the  cost  of editing  constitutes 
only a  small part of the expenditure of a  press  enterprise, 
there  is  a  real  danger  that  the  management  may  be 
tempted to regard the journalists as more or less dependent 
employees.  Hence  the  interest  aroused  in  journalistic  cir-
cles  by certain French moves aimed at founding journalists' 
associations  with  the objective  of recognising  and organis-
ing  the  moral  rights  of  journalists  in  the  publication  to 
which they contribute, through participation in  the manage-
ment if not in the actual ownership of the enterprise. 
The printing  of a  daily  paper  is  distinctly  more  expen-
sive  than the editing.  Printing often represents  as much  as 
45  % of the cost price, half of this going on paper and ink. 
Of course, big  savings are possible here, at least in theory. 
According  to  the  International  Federation  of  Newspaper 
Publishers,  a  few  years  ago  it  took  only  60  hours  to 
compose  an  8-page  paper in  the  United  States,  70  hours 
in the  Netherlands,  but 104  in  Belgium,  132  in  Italy  and 
168  in  France.  Advances  in  electronics  are  opening  up 
considerable  prospects  in  the  field  of publishing,  provided 
of course that these advances are accepted. This must come 
about  but  it  is  still  the  subject  of  numerous  stoppages. 
There is  also  a  fear  of the  social problems  underlying  the 
inevitable  movement  forward.  Certain  trades  are threaten-
ed, the typographers' for example.  But others may come to 
take their  place. There is,  at the  very least,  a  problem of 
readaptation and retraining. 
We  may  also  ask  ourselves  what  will  be  the  economic 
repercussions  following  the  introduction  of new  and even 
revolutionary  techniques.  Is  there  not  a  danger  that  the 
high  cost  of  the  investment  required  will  accelerate  the 
present  process  of concentration?  And  at  the  end  of the 
line,  is  there  not  likely  to  be a  move  towards  the  single 
newspaper,  regarded  by  some  as  a  sure  sign  of  the  end 
of freedom?  Conversely,  however,  many  claim  that  tech-
nical  advances  will  safeguard  the  small  daily.  In  Italy, 
for  example,  a  provincial  paper  with  a  circulation  of 
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20,000  has  succeeded in installing the  most advanced  press 
in Europe. After the initial stage of big investment required 
by  new  techniques  perhaps  these  techniques  themselves 
will  help  to  restore  to  the  press  vast  possibilities  for 
lessening  concentration  and increasing  competition?  Over-
optimistic? It is  difficult  to  decide. 
But manufacturing is  not the whole story. The paper also 
has  to  be  sold.  And this  is  by  no  means  the  least difficult 
part.  Once  again,  the  situation  may  vary  widely,  depend-
ing  on  the  type  of  distribution.  For  example,  if sale  by 
number  predominates  much  depends  on  whether  or  not 
the  enterprise  publishing  the  paper  is  responsible  for 
unsold copies. 
The  type  of distribution  favoured  by  many  newspaper 
publishers  is  postal  subscription.  But  in  a  number  of 
countries,  this  method  of  distribution  is  tending  to  lose 
ground  steadily.  In  France,  where  postal  subscription  is 
less  developed  than  in  the  other  countries  of  the  Com-
munity,  Le Figaro  is  reported  to  have  some  25 % postal 
subscribers and Le Monde 20 %,  but Le Parisien  Libere is 
reported  to  have  a  bare  5 % and  France-Soir  less  than 
1 %. 
Another method which is much used  in the Netherlands 
and in Germany for regional papers and is  also widespread 
in Northern France and Alsace,  is  delivery  to  the  readers 
house. Distribution by this method is  quicker than through 
the  post,  but,  apart  from  the  fact  that  it is  increasingly 
difficult to recruit people to deliver, it is  more costly  than 
postal  subscription  for  the  newspaper  publisher:  the  dis-
count allowed to delivery-stockists  is  in  most cases  higher 
than  that given  to  subscribers. 
Sale  by  a  newsagent,  the  most  usual  method  of  sale, 
is  obviously  also  the  most  risky.  The  front  page  must 
attract  the  customer:  hence  the  importance  of  the  main 
headline  which  must  be  arresting.  In  addition,  the  paper 
must be  on sale at the greatest possible number of points, 
and this increases both the cost of transport and the danger 
of losses  on sales which, barring possible advances in fore-
casting techniques, is affected by a variety of factors. Thus, 
it  is  possible  to  have  averages  of  25  % unsold  copies, 
which  are  as  useless  as  stale  vegetables  in  a  greengrocer's 
shop. 
Distribution,  therefore,  costs  a  great  deal,  as  much  as 
40 % of the cost price in some cases. It plays an important 
part in inflating the cost price, though it must be said that 
the cost price itself is  only  one  factor among others  to  be 
considered  in  forming  an estimate. . . . In fact,  newspapers 
are  often  offered  for  sale  at prices  below  the  cost  price, 
thanks to advertising  to which part (and a  highly variable 
part)  of  the  newspaper  is  in  fact  sold  even  before  the 
reader  pays  his  share. 
The press and advertising 
Advertising  occupies  an  essential  place  in  the  financial 
balance of press enterprises up to 80% in some cases,  and 
very  often  more  than  50 %.  Without  advertising  many 
dailies would not exist, or could only be put on the market 
at  prices  distinctly  higher  than  those  now  charged.  This 
situation is  permanent source of worry to many  dailies. 
While  advertising  investment  is  on  the  increase  in  all 
the  countries  of the  European  Communities,  the  share  of 
the  advertising  budget reserved  for  the  press  is  tending to 
decrease, except in Italy where almost half the daily papers 
in  circulation  are  in  any  case  supported  to  some  extent 
by  large  industrial  or  financial  groups.  Is  the  introduc-
tion  of  television  advertising  to  blame?  There  are  some 
observers  who  deny  that  there  is  any  causal  connection 
but  many  people  think  that  television  advertising  is  to 
blame.  In  any  event,  the  share  of  advertising  budgets 
reserved  for  the  press  is  not  necessarily  reserved  for  the 
daily  press.  In  France,  approximately  40 % of advertising 
expenditure  is  reported  to  be  allocated  to  the  press,  but 
only a third of this  goes  to the daily press.  In Germany, a 
little over 50 % of advertising expenditure is  reported to go 
to the press,  approximately half of it to the daily  press. 
Advertisers  tend  to  be  more  interested  in  periodicals. The daily press  in  the European  Communities 
BELGIUM 
De Standaard 
(Catholic) 
Het  Laatste  Nieuws 
(Liberal) 
Le Soir 
(Independent) 
La  Libre  Belgique 
(Catholic  Right  Wing) 
General  trends 
1 
321,288 
300,000 
278,444 
170,000 
In  Belgium  there  are  42  daily  newspapers, 
of  which  26  are  in  French  with  an  ag-
gregate  circulation  of  about  1,225,000,  15 
are  in  Flemish  with  an  aggregate  circula-
tion  of  about  1,200,000,  and  one  paper  in 
German,  Grenz-Echo,  with  a  circulation  of 
about  15,000.  Ten  of  the  Belgian  dailies 
(6  in French and 4  in Flemish)  are  published 
in  Brussels.  Brussels  is  also  an  important 
printing  centre  for  regional  papers-41 % 
of  all  Belgian  newspapers  are  printed  there. 
Most  of  the  Belgian  press  has  a  political 
bias.  The  politically  neutral  newspapers 
constitute  20.4 %  of  the  total  circulation 
of the country but constitute  the greater part 
of  he  French  press. 
There  has  been  a  movement  towards  con-
centration  of  the  industry,  in  1958  there 
were  47  papers  and  now  there  are  42.  The 
42  papers  are  published  by  18  groups  of 
which  seven  produce  80  %  of  the  aggregate 
circulation. 
HOLLAND 
De TelegriJilj 
(Quality,  Centre  Right, 
national) 
Het Vrije  Volk 
(Socialist) 
A lgemeen  Dagblad 
(Quality  national) 
NRC-Handelsblad 
(The  quality  daily 
in  Holland) 
Het Parool 
(Socialist  independent) 
Trouw 
(Protestant) 
Volkskrant 
(Catholic  Trade Unions) 
De Tijd 
(Quality Catholic 
independent 
General  trends 
430,000 
272.000 
210,000 
100,000 
162,000 
102,000 
200,000 
90,000 
There  are  52  dailies  in  Holland  of  which 
about  60  %  have  some  political  or  religious 
bias.  Despite the density  of the  Dutch popu-
lation and the smallness of the country there 
are  many  regional  papers.  Only  about  12 
of  the  52  mentioned  above  can  be  said  to 
have  a  national  circulation.  There  is  a  trend 
towards  concentration  in  the  Dutch  news-
paper  industry  too.  As  in  Germany  there 
is  integration  between  regional  newspapers 
at an editorial level-e.g.  the  various  papers 
which  belong  to  the  "Grote  Provinciale 
Dagbladpers"  company  which  together  have 
a  circulation  of  about  one  million.  There 
have  also  been  many  mergers  between  the 
publishing  houses.  Today there are  52  dailies 
but  only  35  publishing  houses  as  against 
54  in  1960  and  58  in  1950. 
1  Daily  circulation  figures. 
FRANCE 
France-Soir  1 
(National,  popular)  1,240,000 
Le  Parisien  Libere 
(National,  popular)  830,000 
Le Figaro 
(National centre  right)  515,030 
Le  Monde 
(Independent,  quality 
of international standing)  450,COO 
Ouest-France 
(Regional)  630,000 
General  trends 
The  total  number  of  dailies  in  France  is 
103,  of  which  13  are  published  in  Paris 
and  90  are  published  in  the  regions.  The 
Parisian  press  has  been  on  the  decline  for 
sometime  while  the  regional  press  has  been 
expanding  gradually.  In  1939  the  Parisian 
Press  constituted  55 %  of  the  national  cir-
culation  figures.  Today  it  only  constitutes 
30  %. 
There  is  also  a  trend  towards  concentration 
newspaper  industry  but  it  is  not  as  pro-
nounced  as  in  Germany.  In  1946  there  were 
100  more  newspapers  in  France  than  there 
are  today.  Joint  advertising  agreements  be-
tween  newspapers  are  becoming  increasingly 
common.  In  France  there  are  few  news-
papers  which  are  politically  committed.  In 
Paris  there  are  three  which  are  overtly 
political-L'Humanite  (Communist  party). 
Combat  (left-orientated),  L'  Aurore  (Right). 
ITALY 
II Corriere della  Sera 
(Quality National  Liberal) 
La Stampa 
(Regional,  Turin, 
quality  Centre  Left) 
II  Giorno 
(National,  Socialist) 
L'Unita 
(Communist party) 
General  trends 
1 
570,000 
475,000 
275,0()0 
150,000 
In  Italy  the  total  number  of  dailies  is  83, 
but of these  only  77  are  completely separate 
editions.  Of  the  83,  47  are  published  in 
Northern Italy (including  10  in Milan),  20  in 
central  Italy  (including  16  in  Rome),  6  in 
Southern  Italy  (including  4  in  Naples)  and 
10  in  the  islands  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia. 
There  is  a  great  difference  between  circula-
tion  figures  in  the  North  and  South  of 
Italy.  The  North  having  63.5  %  of  the 
Total  National  Circulation  and  the  South 
having  36.5  %.  The  number  of  papers  sold 
per  1 000  inhabitants  is  less  than  30  in 
some  areas  and  approaches  250  in  others. 
There  are  practically  no  papers  in  Italy 
which  have  a  national  circulation.  The  three 
papers  mentioned  above  are  among  the  few 
to  be  circulated  beyond  the  region  in  which 
they  are  printed.  About  15  %  of  the  Italian 
dailies  are  politically  committed  but  this  is 
tending  to  decline.  Periodicals  of  interna-
tional  reputation  such  as  Domenico-del 
Carriere  (circulation  1  million),  Oggi  (circu-
lation  900,000)  compensate  for  the  low  cir-
culation  figures  of  the  dailies.  These  period-
icals  contain  considerable  amounts  of 
information on economics  and politics,  while 
the  daily  papers  tend  to  contain  more  popu-
lar,  sensational  news. 
GERMANY 
Bild  Zeitung  1 
(popular  national)  4,100,000 
Westdeutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
(regional)  530,000 
Ruhrnachrichtenf 
Westfalen-Post 
(regional)  340,000 
Frankfurter  Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
(quality regional 
with national circulation)  245,000 
Siiddeutsche  Zeitun1. 
(quality  regional  With 
national  circulation)  230,000 
Die Welt 
(quality  national)  226,000 
General  trends 
The  total  number  of  daily  newspapers  in 
Germany  is  467  but  of  these  only  149  are 
really  separate  newspapers  with  independent 
editorial  departments  since  many  of  the 
regional  newspapers  belong  to  a  Redaktions-
gemeinschaft  i.e.  a  company  of  newspapers 
under  one  editorial  department.  The  trend 
towards  concentration  in  the  industry  is 
continuing  in  Germany.  The  Springer  group 
with  its  five  dailies  and  two  Sunday  news-
papers  has  38.3  %  of  total  circulation  of 
dailies  and  Sunday  newspapers  in  Germany. 
Most  German  newspapers  are  politically 
independent  or  neutral-very  few  admit 
openly  to  political  affiliation. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Das  Luxemburger Wort 
(Catholic) 
Das  Escher  Tagblatt 
(Socialist) 
Das Letzeburger Journal 
(Liberal) 
General  trends 
65,000 
34,000 
25,000 
In  Luxembourg  there  are  no  specifically  na-
tional  papers which  are  independent or  neu-
tral.  Each  of  the  four  political  parties  has 
its own daily  as  shown above.  Foreign news-
papers  are  widely  read  in  Luxembourg.  The 
Luxembourg  papers  are  written  in  German 
but  there  are  often  subtitles  and  articles  in 
French  and  the  majority  of  advertisements 
are  in  French. It  is  often  more  rewarding  to  advertise  in  periodicals 
owing  to  better  presentation,  the  longer  time  spent  in 
reading  them,  and  their  more  intensive  circulation,  not 
to  mention  the  greater  ease  with  which  an  advertising 
campaign  can  be  organised  in  a  comparatively  small 
range  of  magazines  and  the  increased  profitability  of 
advertising  aimed at more  clearly  defined  types  of reader. 
Mention  must  also  be  made  of  the  fact  that  there  is  a 
continual  increase  in  the  number  of  regional  and  local 
papers-largely,  if  not  wholely,  given  to  advertising-
delivered  free,  to  the  detriment  of  the  daily  press.  The 
dailies  are  therefore  obliged  to  seek  out  advertisers  and 
this  is  not  without  its  effect  on  the  presentation  and 
content of the  newspapers. 
Owing  to  advertising,  the  number  of  pages  in  news-
papers  has  increased  appreciably:  thus,  in  France,  the 
average number of pages in  1946  was  only four,  now it is 
over twenty.  In France, a  newspaper with an income from 
advertising  representing  approximately  15 % of its  budget, 
will  print  on  average  8  pages  while  a  newspaper  whose 
income from  advertising is  at least five  times  as  high,  will 
print on average 24 pages. 
The format,  quality  of paper and use  of colour may  be 
governed  by  the  demands  of advertising  to which  a  news-
paper must concede unless  it wishes  to lose  certain adver-
tisers and with them certain readers, too, who are influenc-
ed  more  by  the  form  than  the  content.  The  effect  of 
advertising  on  the  content  of the  paper causes  anxiety  to 
some  observers.  They  are  worried  about  pressure-even 
tacit pressure-being exerted  by  advertisers  on  the  expres-
sion  of  certain  opinions.  The  term  "pressure"  may  be 
inadequate. If the term 'collusion', natural and spontaneous 
though it may be between men whose interests coincide,  is 
more  in keeping  with  the  facts,  this  is  now  way  removes 
the  causes  for  disquiet.  On  the  other  hand,  it  often 
becomes  very  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  the prod-
uct  of  independent  editing  and  of  advertising;  between 
disinterested  practical  advice  and  disguised  incitement  to 
acquire  this  or  that  commodity;  especially  since  adver-
tisers  tend  to  present  advertising  as  information.  The 
dependence  of the daily press  on advertising  has  a  further 
important  effect:  it constitutes  one  of  the  most  decisive 
factors  in the movement towards  concentration. 
The daily  press is  caught in a  kind of vice.  On  the one 
side,  the  costs  of printing  and  distribution  are  high.  The 
cost of printing  can in  principle  be  reduced  but  only  by 
very  little.  On  the  other  hand,  readers  are  not  disposed 
-at  least so it is  thought---<to  pay ,the real price of a news-
paper which counts only on sales to readers for its income. 
They  do  not  see  the  value  of  a  financially  independent 
newspaper.  As  for  governments,  they  are  not  disposed 
to permit price increases, especially if, as in Belgium, these 
increases  are  reflected  in  a  rise  in  the  consumer  price 
index,  to  which  salaries and  wages  and social  services  are 
automatically  linked. 
Faced with  a  press  whose  very  existence  depends  on it, 
advertising is  in danger of upsetting the free  play  of com-
petition.  In  fact  it favours  the  papers  that  suit  it-those 
which have a circulation and content that meet its needs-, 
and it hastens  the demise of those  in which  it decides  not 
to take an interest. 
Of  course,  in  the  early  stages,  advertising  often  only 
leads  to  joint  advertising  agreements  between  dailies,  the 
aim being  to  constitute a  total  readership  sufficiently  high 
to  attract  advertisers.  These  joint  advertising  agreements 
may  later  lead  to  other  agreements,  extending  the  joint 
activity  either  to  certain  departments  or  to  the  whole  of 
the  editorial,  technical  and  commercial  departments.  But 
these  are  often no  more  than temporary palliatives. 
Fast-increasing  concentration 
In  Germany,  the  number  of  press  units  (daily  papers 
with complete editorial departments) fell  from  225  in 1954 
to  149  in  1969.  In  France,  some  thirty  regional  dailies 
disappeared  during  the  same  period.  The  Italian  press 
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seems  to be less  affected,  though it shows  the symptoms of 
imminent  change.  In  all  the  countries  of  the  European 
Community,  papers  are  simply  disappearing. 
Sometimes,  papers in difficulties  will  be  bought for their 
name  by  others  in  a  stronger  position.  But  this  does  not 
often happen. The powerful daily which  buys  the name of 
a  weaker  daily  hopes,  perhaps  with  the  help  of  a  few 
adjustments,  to take  over  its  readership.  But the outcome 
is  never  certain.  Readers  are  astonishingly  passive  about 
the  content  of  the  paper  to  which  they  are  accustomed 
-to such  an extent  that one  might  suppose  the purchase 
of a  daily  paper  to  be  a  matter  of  habit  rather  than  a 
purposeful act corresponding to a  real felt need-but they 
are  strangely  faithful  to  presentation  and  name  and  any 
change in either will often entail  a  loss  of readership. 
Concentration  is  leading,  in  France  for  example,  to  an 
effective  monopoly by the  big  regional  papers,  each in  its 
area  of  distribution,  the  boundaries  of  which  are  them-
selves  settled  by agreement between  the  newspapers in  the 
various regions. 
In Germany where  one  can  speak  more  of mergers  be 
tween  technically  under-developed  and  financially  weak 
publishing houses and large firms  with considerable capital 
at their  disposal,  concentration  takes  place  in  the  forma-
tion of actual chains of newspapers which have a  common 
owner,  a  common  national  editorial  department,  common 
administrative  and  financial  departments  and  technical 
facilities,  but  continue  to  appear  under  different  names 
with  their  own  regional  or  local  pages.  The  best-known 
chain  is  that  of  Mr.  Axel  Springer,  who  controls  almost 
40 % of the  total  circulation  of daily  and  Sunday  news-
papers. 
Whatever  the  process  of  concentration,  whatever  its 
rythm  of development  and  whatever  the  concrete  form  it 
finally  takes,  it appears  that,  encouraged  as  it is  by  the 
apathy  of  readers,  the  present  trends  are  well  established 
and  will  not  change.  Moreover,  the  phenomenon  is  not 
confined  to the Common Market countries. 
Where does Europe come in? 
But  where  is  Europe  in  all  this ?  The  European  press 
is  as yet nothing but the sum of strictly separated national 
and regional  presses. 
Linguistic  and  political  factors  explain  this  fragmenta-
tion.  In this  respect, Europe is  still in the  making and the 
various national characteristics remain very marked,  if not 
sometimes  deliberately exaggerated.  Furthermore, since  the 
daily press  often-as we  have  emphasized--shows a  regio-
nal  bias,  it  is  highly  improbable  that  a  daily  paper 
distributed  in  Marseilles  could  interest  a  citizen  of Ham-
burg and vice versa. 
In  the  matter of editorial  co-operation,  three  interesting 
experiments  seem  worthy  of attention  in  the field  of daily 
newspapers: 
- The  formation  of  a  regional  Committee  to  prov-
ide  contact  between  the  directors  of  certain  German, 
Belgian  and  Dutch  dailies  covering  adjoining  regions. 
- The  formation  of  Top  European  Advertising  Media 
(TEAM),  an  international  group  of  newspapers  which  at 
present includes  18  dailies,  11  of which are published within 
the  Community  is  also  noteworthy.  This  group  is  mainly 
concerned  with  the conduct of a  big  public  relations  cam-
paign. 
- Also,  'Top  5'  combines  within  the  geographical 
boundaries  of the  Common  Market,  five  daily  or  weekly 
newspapers  specialising  in  economic  information.  These 
five  newspapers  exchange  articles  and  have  a  common 
advertising  department  which  offers  a  total  fixed  price 
for simultaneous publication of a  single advertisement. 
On  the  whole,  however,  it  would  seem  that  as  far  as 
the  daily  press  is  concerned,  co-operation  at  a  European 
level is  still in its infancy. As regards concentration-which 
must  not  be  confused  with  free  co-operation-while  the 
Commission  of the  European  Communities  is  of the  opi-
nion  that 'the maintenance  of a  varied  daily  press  is  one of the most important obligations incumbent on a  modern 
democracy',  it is  also  a  fact  that  'the  institutions  of the 
Community are unable to keep  a  watch on the  concentra-
tion  of political  power in the  field  of daily  papers  or  to 
forbid it'.l 
II.  The daily press  in  Britain 
Together  with  Sweden,  Britain  has  one  of  the  highest 
readerships  of  daily  newspapers  in  the  world,  with  490 
copies  produced  per  1,000  head  of  the  population.  In 
addition  to  their  enormous  appetite  for  daily  newspapers, 
the  British  are  also  remarkable  for  their  consumption  of 
Sunday newspapers, one of which, The News of the  World, 
has  after  the  three  main  daily  Japanese  newspapers,  the 
largest circulation figure  in the  world (6,000,000). 
National papers 
In  Britain  there  are  ten  national  morning  newspapers 
which  are  on  sale  throughout  the  country.  Four  have 
provincial editions: the Daily Telegraph,  Daily Mail,  Daily 
Mirror  and  Daily  Express  have  Manchester  editions.  The 
Daily  Mirror  also  has  a  Belfast  edition  and  the  Daily 
Express a Scottish edition. They are independent of political 
parties,  with  the  exception  of  the  Communist  Morning 
Star  which  has  a  very  insignificant  circulation.  They  can 
be  distinguished  as  papers  inclined  towards  the  right  or 
towards  the  left  although  many  take  neutral  positions. 
They  fall  into  two  groups:  "quality"  and  "popular." 
Quality: 
Guardian:  304,000 Financial Times:  166,000  Times:  402,000 
Daily  Telegraph:  1,416,000  2. 
Quality  newspapers  have  a  high  proportion  of  readers 
from  the  upper  income  brackets  and  from  among  the 
decision-makers  in Government,  the  professions  and  busi-
ness.  They  have  substantially  smaller  circulation  than 
popular papers  but  attract advertising  revenue  because  of 
the  wealth  and  influence  of  their  readers.  Quality  papers 
draw  from  two-thirds  to  three-quarters  of  their  revenue 
from advertising. 
Popular: 
Daily  Mirror:  4,500,000  Sun:  1,500,000  Daily  Sketch: 
806,000  Daily  Mail:  2,000,000  Daily  Express:  3,500,000 2• 
Popular  newspapers  have  large  circulations  and  attract 
advertising  by  the  numbers  and  total  spending-power  of 
their  readers  as  consumers.  On  average  popular  papers 
draw  only  two-fifths  of  their  revenue  from  advertising. 
They depend on large circulation to cover  their  costs. 
Regional and provincial papers 
There  are  101  provincial  and local  daily  newspapers  in 
Britain: 82 in England, 61  of which are evening newspapers; 
4  in  Wales,  2  of  which  are  evening  newspapers;  12  in 
Scotland,  7  of  which  are  evening  newspapers;  and  3  in 
Northern  Ireland.  Some  are  of  national  standing,  The 
Scotsman, Scotland's quality newspaper (circulation: 76,000); 
The  Yorkshire  Post  (circulation:  121,000);  and  The  Birm-
ingham  Post  (circulation:  70,000).  Several  have  circulation 
figures  which  equal  some  national  dailies:  Birmingham 
Evening  Mail:  400,000;  Manchester  Evening  News  and 
Chronicle:  450,000;  Daily  Record (Glasgow):  530,000. 
There  are  2  London  evening  papers  which  are  not 
national  in  their  distribution:  The  Evening  News  (cir-
1  Journal  Officiel  des  Communautes  Europeennes,  4  May  1968, 
reply  to  a  written  question  No.  309/67  from  M.  Westerterp. 
2  1970  figures  (estimated  in  some  cases)  including  the  provincial 
editions. 
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culation:  1,000,000)  and The Evening Standard (circulation: 
500,000).  As in the EEC countries there has been a  decline 
in the number of national daily  newspapers in recent years 
and  a  relative  increase  in  the  circulation  and  advertising 
revenue of the provincial evening newspapers. 
The newspaper crisis 1 
The continuing and worsening crisis  of the  British press 
became increasingly apparent in the late 1960s. The acquisi-
tion of The  Times by Thomson newspapers symbolized the 
shaky finances  of Fleet street.  People were  astonished  that 
the future  of such important papers as  The Times and The 
Guardian  should be in doubt. 
Formerly  newspapers  had  failed  because  they  had  be-
gan  to  lose  readers  to  competitors  and  so  entered  the 
downward  trend  of  falling  circulation  leading  to  less 
advertising  revenue  and so  to  smaller  and less  interesting 
newspapers.  But  The  Times  and  The  Guardian  were  not 
failing  in this  sense  as  both were  increasing  their  circula-
tion  figures.  The  analysis  of the  problems  of  the  British 
Press  written in the PEP Report in  1938  was  still valid in 
1966  and is  still valid today. 
"A  relatively  large  number  of independent  newspapers 
of varied  views  is  gradually  being  replaced  by  a  remark-
ably  small  number  of  mass  circulation  national  journals 
dominating the national newspaper field.  At the same  time 
the  number  of  separate  newspaper  proprietors  of import-
ance has rapidly diminished owing  to  the growth of chains 
of  newspapers  and  periodicals.  The  cost  of  launching  a 
newspaper  has  recently  risen  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be 
virtually  prohibitive  so  that  the  surviving  newspapers,  al-
though  competing  fiercely  among  themselves,  are  largely 
sheltered  from  the  competition of new  entrants.  Then  the 
rise  of national advertising  encourages  enlargement of the 
size  of  successful  popular  papers  and  in  particular  the 
expansion  of  features  and  the  entertainment  side  in  rela-
tion to news  and comment." 
By  1966  concentration  had  resulted  in  three  groups 
owning  two-thirds  of the  morning  paper circulation:  Mir-
ror  and  Sun  (left  of  centre)  26 %;  Mail  and  Sketch 
(right  of  centre)  21  %;  Express  (right  wing)  18  %. 
By  1966  of  the  total  morning  paper  sales  of  15,600,000 
newspapers,  just over 2,000,000  went to the  quality papers 
-The Daily  Telegraph  (right  wing),  The  Times  (right  of 
centre,  The  Guardian  (left  of centre),  and  The  Financial 
Times  (specialist  finance  and  business).  In  1969  the 
Mirror  Group  sold  the  Sun  to  Mr.  Rupert  Murdoch,  the 
Australian  newspaper  proprietor  and  a  newcomer  to  the 
British  scene.  Since  then,  the  Sun  has  increased  its  cir-
culation,  partly at the  expense  of the  Mirror. 
Advertising  revenue  decreased in the  mid-1960's  because 
of the general economic crisis  and the squeeze.  The Prices 
and  Incomes  Board  report  on  the  Costs  and  Revenue  of 
National Daily Newspapers  Report No. 43  Cmnd.  3435  in 
1967, said that the economic problems of the industry were 
due to  the nature of competition within the industry which 
has  caused  some  newspapers  to  be  highly  profitable  while 
others  make  heavy  losses;  the  industry's  failure  to  meet 
competition  from  commercial  television;  and  thirdly 
excessive  costs  particularly  in  the  field  of manpower. 
The  1970  Report of the  Prices  and Incomes  Board said 
that although some progress has been made in recent years 
there  is  still  scope  for  more  realistic  manning  levels,  in 
improving  productivity  and  in  technical  innovation-this 
will  involve  the  co-operation  of  the  unions  and  an  im-
provement in inter-union co-operation. Thus it can be seen 
that the  newspaper industry  in  Britain  is  still  in  a  critical 
condition  and  perhaps  in  even  more  difficulties  than  the 
newspaper  industry  on  the  continent. 
I  The Economist Intelligence Unit, The National Newspaper Industry: 
A  Survey,  1966. 
THOMAS,  Harford, Newspaper Crisis:  A  Study of developments  in  the 
national  press  of  Britain  1966-67.  Published:  The  International  Press 
Institute,  Zurich,  1967. European  Studies,  10,  1970 
The  urban  phenomenon  Europe  {I) 
•  1n 
Webster's  Third  New  International  Dictionary  tells  us  that  the  city  is  •a 
populous  place;  a  place  larger  than  a  village ...  a  large,  prominent or  important 
centre of population .. .' Just  how large  a place has to be  in order to be  classified 
as 'urban',  to be a  town  or even a city (current  English  usage  provides  no  firm 
dividing  line  between the two) is  in  the  first  place  a matter of official  definition. 
'Urban'  can  mean  a  cluster  of as  few  as  200  people  in  Sweden,  and  even  in 
France  the  lower  limit  is  only 2,000.  This study on a  west  European  scale  (the 
original  'Six'  of  the  European  Community  plus  the  British  Isles,  Austria  and 
Switzerland) will take as  its lower limit the figure  of 100,000,  but special attention 
will be  given  to the  metropolitan  agglomerations  of from  one  to  twelve  million 
people that dominate the  human geography  of Europe today. 
Defining the European  city 
Our first  difficulty  is  to define  what  is  meant by 
a  city  even  in  the  superficially  simple  sense  of an 
assemblage of buildings within which a certain num-
ber  of  people  live  and  work. 
Delimitation 
Administrative  boundaries  are  here  of little  use, 
since  cities  in  their  growth  tend  to  outrun  them. 
The population  of  the  city  of  Paris,  for  example, 
stands in the reference books at a mere 2.6 millions, 
but the 'real' agglomeration of people who consider 
themselves in some measure Parisians has a steadily 
increasing population of over 8 millions. 
To  make  matters  worse  there  is  no  consistency 
in the manner in which the various European coun-
tries  define  their  cities  for  administrative  reasons. 
In  France  the  city  boundaries  are  extraordinarily 
'tight'. having been remarkably static throughout all 
the  explosive  city growth  of  the  last  150  years,  so 
that the city populations given in works of reference 
are  likely  to  be  highly  misleading.  German  cities 
experienced less  difficulty in extending their admin-
istrative limits as they grew, so that their population 
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figures  are less misleading.  The proportion of  pop-
ulation  within  the  politically-defined  city  may  be 
as  high  as  60  per  cent  (Munich)  or even  80  per 
cent (Hamburg). Difficulties of definition can be even 
greater in regions such as the Ruhr, northern France 
or west  Yorkshire, where  a  number  of  cities  grow 
together to form a conurbation, and it may be quite 
impossible to decide where one city ends and another 
begins. 
In such circumstances, any comparative study must 
seek a uniform delimitation of the city, which ideally 
must  be  as  near  to  the  'real'  or  'agglomeration' 
population  as  possible.  The  French  official  stat- . 
isticians, for example, use maps and air photographs 
to  define  the  actual  'bricks  and  mortar'  extent  of 
urban agglomerations, producing (1968)  1,383 'urban 
units' of 2,000 people or more. The Germans define 
(1961) 68 Stadregionen of 80,000 popula·tion or more, 
which however include a much wider extent of terri-
tory around the central city than the French agglom-
erations.  The  British  confine  themselves  to  seven 
major conurbations, loosely  defined  by  aggregating 
local-government  areas.  Useful  though  all  these 
attempts are for studies restricted to a single country, 
they are not easily used for international comparison. 
Fortunately the Institute of International Studies  at 
the University of Berkeley in California has calcul-ated the  population of cities  of  100,000  population 
and over on as  nearly  a  uniform  basis  as  possible. 
The method of defining city populations was in most 
instances that of the US  Census, where the popula-
tion of the central city is  grouped with the popula-
tions of surrounding administrative units to produce 
a metropolitan area population approximating to the 
'real' population of the agglomeration. Figures prod-
uced  in  this  way  provide  a  most  useful  basis  of 
comparison 1• 
A place to work and live in 
But  a  city  is  more  than  a  group  of  a  certain 
size  of people  occupying  a  collection  of  buildings. 
It is  also  'a relatively permanent and highly  organ-
ized  centre  having  a  population  with  varied  skills, 
lacking self  -sufficiency in the production of food and 
usually  depending  primarily  on  manufacture  and 
commerce  to satisfy  the  wants  of its  inhabitants ... ' 
(Webster).  Some  of  these  economic  activities  that 
enable a city to exist will be world-wide in character, 
as  we  are  reminded  most of  all  by  the  great  port 
cities such as London, Rotterdam or Antwerp, receiv-
ing food and raw materials from the end of the earth, 
to  be  paid for in manufactured goods  and commer-
cial  services.  Other  activities  are  more  local:  the 
city as  a  'central place' provides  an 'urban field'  of 
surrounding  territory  with  shopping  facilities,  per-
sonal services of all kinds, commercial organization, 
public  administration,  newspapers  and  other forms 
of information. Under modem conditions of transport 
the city's own workers may also live far out in the 
surrounding countryside, joining in daily commuting 
flows from countryside and satellite town to and from 
the  central  city.  In  these  various  ways  we  cannot 
think of the 'city' as confined to  the agglomeration, 
however  broadly defined.  Cities  become  organizing 
centres  for  vast  tracts  of  surrounding  countryside, 
their  radiating  influence  increasingly  dissolving  the 
formerly shal1' distinctions between urban and rural 
society. 
Last of all, cities  are places  of maximum human 
interaction,  great  ganglia  of  communication.  Here 
the  structures  of an older Europe  are  dissolved  in 
which  each  man  knew  his  place,  performing  the 
role  appropriate  to  his  position  in  economy  and 
society.  In the interplay of human minds  ideas  are 
created, opinions formed, decisions taken. For many 
people  the city  is  where  life  is  lived  at its  fullest, 
where the stresses and challenges of the environment 
may be  so  great as  to  be  at times  intolerable,  but 
where  the creative response  is  at its  highest. 
City size 
Rather  surprisingly,  Europe  does  not  stand  in 
particular prominence in the ranking of the world's 
I  K.  DAVIS,  World  Urbanization  1950-1970,  vol.  1.  Berkeley,  Cali-
fornia  (Institute  of  International  Studies,  University  of  California), 
1969. 
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cities. The figures  prepared by the Institute of Inter-
national  Studies  admittedly  put  London  in  third 
place and Paris in sixth, but one must drop to  13th 
for  the  third  west  European  city  and  as  low  as 
36th for  the fourth.  Only  17  of the first  100  world 
cities  are in western Europe. 
Table 1 
World rank by population of western European cities 
City  11970  pmjoctionsl W "'  Eruopoan I  World 
OOOs  rank  rank 
London  11,544  1  3 
Paris  8,714  2  6 
Ruhr  6,789  3  13 
Birmingham  2,981  4  36 
Rome  2,920  5  37 
Manchester  2,541  6  47 
Hamburg  2,407  \  7  54 
West Berlin  2,240  8  59 
Glasgow  2,008  9  67 
Leeds-Bradford  1,945  10  72 
Stuttgart  1,935  11  73 
Vienna  1,890  12  78 
Liverpool  1,823  13  81 
Cologne  1,788  14  83 
Milan  1,750  15  86 
Mannheim-
Ludwigshafen-
Heidelberg  1,578  16  95 
Munich  1,502  17  100 
Source:  K.  DAVIS,  World  Urbanization  1950-1970,  vol.  1.  See 
footnote  p.  224. 
Much  of  this  apparently  low  status  of city  dev-
elopment in western Europe is  due to the relatively 
recent  rise  of  the  great  cities  of  Asia  and  Latin 
America. These however are found in societies that, 
except  for  Japan,  are  still  predominantly  rural. 
cities  are  in  some  real  degree  isolated  phenomena. 
In western Europe by contrast the population living 
in  'urban  places'  of  one  kind  or  another  reaches 
75  per cent, even 80 per cent or more in the United 
Kingdom and the German Federal Republic. Western 
Europe is  characterised by an extraordinary density 
of urban people, and the towns  and cities  in which 
they dwell. 
City distribution 
Even  so,  the  distribution  of towns  and  cities  is 
far from even. A map of population agglomerations 
of  100,000  and above  (see  insert)  shows  a  marked 
concentration  into  a  European 'axial  belt'  running 
from  Lancashire  southwards  through  Greater  Lon-
don  and  the  Rhinelands  to  the  cities  of  northern 
Italy.  As  the  population  of western  Europe is  pre-
dominently urban, it is  a matter of no surprise that 
this axial belt of European city development is  also 
the axial belt of European population (see the map of 
population density in 'The population of the  Euro-
pean  Community',  European  Studies  1,  1968).  A D 
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---- NATIONAL BOUNDARY second  belt  of  urban  development  and  population 
density runs  eastwards  from  the Rhine-Ruhr cross-
roads  of  Europe  through  the  German  Democratic 
Republic toward Polish Silesia, but is of much lesser 
significance than in the undivided Germany of prewar 
years. Away from the axial belts population density 
drops  off  sharply except where  the  few  large cities 
stand  as  'islands'  of  dense  population.  Typically 
these are ei~ther capital cities (Berlin, ¥ienna, Madrid, 
Rome)  or great ports  (Marseilles,  Barcelona,  Ham-
burg). These areas of high population density, wheth-
er  in  the  main  axial  belt  or  around  great  cities 
elsewhere,  are also  with minor exceptions  the areas 
which  since  1945  have  experienced  the  highest 
population  growth.  Europeans  are  on  the  move 
towards the cities, or more particularly towards their 
expanding fringes. 
City development 
The move from  the  land 
Primarily the Europeans are leaving agriculture as 
an occupation (see 'Manpower in the Common Mar-
ket', European Studies 2,  1968),  especially in coun-
tries  such  as  France  and  Italy  that  still  have  a 
relatively large proportion of their population in the 
agricultural sector of the economy. Yet occupational 
mobility does not always imply geographical mobili-
ty.  Some  areas,  where  dense  rural  populations  are 
associated  with  numerous  towns  and  cities,  have 
a  long  tradition  of 'worker-peasants'  who  combine 
small-scale  farming  with  work  in  industry.  In such 
circumstances it is  natural to  stay on in the  family 
house  even  when  farming  is  given  up.  As  the  pro-
portion of the population employed outside agricul-
ture grows  so  the village  turns into a working-class 
commuter settlement, characteristic of areas such  as 
Hessen,  southwest  Germany  and  parts  of  the  Low 
Countries, spreading urban influence yet deeper into 
the countryside. Most of those who leave agriculture 
however, especially outside the axial belt, are obliged 
sooner or later to move to the cities, contributing to 
the 35 million people added to the urban population 
of western Europe in the last 20  years. 
Industry  and cities 
The  great  urban  expansion  of  the  nineteenth 
century  drew  men from  the  land for  hard physical 
labour  in  construction,  especially  of  the  railways, 
in  mines  and  in  factories.  Today  machinery  has 
eased  the  strain  on  human  muscle,  the  remaining 
jobs of this type are often left for immigrant workers. 
Investigations in France have shown that indigenous 
rural-urban migrants  are today more  likely  to  seek 
the lower-paid  jobs  in the  tertiary sector,  as  distri-
butive  workers,  postmen,  caretakers  and  the  like. 
Owing  to  the  development  of  automation  in  the 
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more advanced branches of industry, and the decline 
of some of the older branches, manufacturing indus-
try  as  a  whole  is  not  increasing  its  demands  for 
labour at anything like the rate that people are leav-
ing agriculture. 
The  marked  differences  in  the  growth  rates  of 
various  types  of  industry also  influence  the growth 
of cities. Since 1958 coal mining has been in constant 
decline, while a number of industries associated with 
coal,  such as  coal-based chemicals and some of the 
steel  industry  and  branches  of  heavy  engineering 
are  also  static  or  declining.  In  the  years  before 
1914 many towns grew rapidly on the basis of these 
industries, especially in the Ruhr complex, Lorraine, 
northern France, southern Belgium, the Vosges textile 
district  and the  present  British development  areas. 
Today they have rather s~tatic or  declining populations. 
Often their precocious industrialization has left them 
an  heritage  of industrial squalor which  inhibits  the 
establishment of new  industries or even drives  their 
more enterprising inhabitants away,  like  the former 
Ruhr miners  who  have  gone  to  work  in  the  more 
pleasant surrounding  of southwest  Germany. 
In  the  days  when  these  cities  grew,  transport 
was  less  well  developed  than  at present, and there 
was  a  strong  tendency  for  industry  to  be  drawn 
towards  the  sources  of  coal  and minerals,  creating 
urban complexes like the Ruhr and Lorraine. Today 
quite  new  sources  of energy  are  tapped, electricity, 
oil and gas, but it is no longer necessary for industry 
and  workers  to  move to the  places  where  they  are 
found.  By  cable  or pipeline  these  forms  of  energy 
can be  delivered  wherever  they  are  required,  espe-
cially  to  existing  cities.  At the  same  time  industry 
itself  has  changed  its  nature;  its  prime  locational 
attraction  tends  to  be  towards  labour  and  other 
industrial  plants.  By labour we  mean either  highly 
skilled  managers  and  technicians,  or  the  largest 
possible  pool  of  men  and  women  who  are  accus-
tomed to routine production-line operations. Both are 
likely  to  be  found  in  the  largest  numbers  in  and 
around  existing  great cities.  The second  attraction, 
to  other  manufacturing  plants,  exists  because  the 
chain  of  production  is  today so  long  and  complex 
that many plants  produce only components that are 
assembled  by  other  plants  into  a  final  product. 
In  such  circumstances  proximity  is  clearly  an  ad-
vantage,  and  plants  in  such  chains  of  production 
tend to group in and around urban agglomerations, 
very  typically the old regional and national capitals 
of western Europe. In its way vehicle and component 
manufacturers  cluster  in  and  around  Birmingham, 
Stuttgart,  Paris  and  Turin.  What  is  more,  these 
newer, complex industries like electronics or vehicle 
assembly  also  have  high  growth  rates,  and  these 
in  turn  are  communicated to  the  urban  complexes 
where  the  industries  cluster.  New  arrivals  leapfrog 
over one another to locations in suburbs and satellite 
towns,  drawing in ever fresh  waves  of labour to be 
in  turn  an  attaction  to  yet  more  industry,  so  that 
the  exploding  agglomeration  expands  even  further. The tertiary sector 
In  the  negative  sense  the  tertiary  sector  of  the 
economy embraces all those not employed in agricul-
ture,  mining  and  manufacturing,  yet  we  must  not 
write off all so employed as 'unproductive'. Tertiary 
activities  such  as  transport,  designing,  information 
processing,  much of banking and some  administra-
tion, serve industry directly, reinforcing the locational 
pull of the city. Head offices of industrial firms, great 
banks  and  insurance  companies  cluster  together  in 
distinct  financial  quarters,  partly for  ease  of  inter-
communication, partly for reasons of prestige. Even 
personal services reinforce the trend;  while grocers' 
shops, hairdressers. primary schools or general medi-
cal  practitioners  are distributed  roughly  in  propor-
tion  to  population,  higher  services  such  as  depart-
ment  stores.  universities  or teaching  hospitals  may 
serve  a population measured in millions;  the centre 
of a  great city,  of a  regional  or national  capital. is 
the  obvious location. 
The tertiary sector of the economy, then, is heavily 
concentrated  in  cities,  especially  the  great  cities: 
Paris. for example, with less  than a fifth  of French 
population has well  over a quarter of the country's 
employment  in the  tertiary  sector.  Yet this  is  also 
the  sector  of  the  economy  where  growth  is  most 
rapid of all,  a  powerful motor of urban expansion. 
Far more than manufacturing industry, tertiary acti-
vity  is  concentrated  in  the  very  heart  of the  city: 
nearly  a  million  people,  for  example,  work  in  the 
offices  of central Paris. Inevitably the employees  of 
this expanding sector must seek dwellings ever further 
out  in  the  surrounding  countryside.  condemning 
themselves to long daily journeys to and from work, 
and contributing  to  the  urban  explosion  that is  so 
characteristic of our century. 
Controlling cities 
Particularly  in  Britain  and  France.  governments 
have  attempted to  combat the concentration of too 
much  economic  and  urban  growth  into  great  city-
regions  elsewhere.  The  Italian  government  has  a 
somewhat  similar policy  in  an attempt to  promote 
a  balanced  growth  between  north  and  south.  In 
France. as  in Britain, the government depends  on a 
dual  series  of  measures,  discouraging  the  growth 
of employment in  the  capital,  and  encouraging  the 
creation  of  employment  elsewhere.  New  industrial 
or office  floorspace  in  the  Paris region  can be  cre-
ated only by special  permission,  involving  the  pay-
ment  of  special  levies  when  a  permit  is  granted. 
Simultaneously employment  is  attracted away from 
Paris  by  a  system  of  tax  advantages,  grants  and 
loans  accorded  to  developers.  The  French govern-
ment has also attempted to combat the quite extra-
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ordinary dominance of Paris in  the urban structure 
of  the  country by  favouring  the  development  of  a 
number of metro  poles d' equilibre as  urban counter-
magnets to Paris, cities like Lille, Lyons or Toulouse. 
A  number of government  research  and educational 
establishments  have  also  been  transferred  out  of 
Paris. 
There is  some  evidence that the policy has  been 
successful.  The amount  of industrial floorspace  al-
located for new development in the Paris region has 
tended  to be reduced. and in the period  1962-1968 
industrial employment fell by 1.1  per cent at a time 
when  in the  country as  a  whole  it went  up by 6.5 
per  cent.  As  the  number  of  new  office  buildings 
(including government offices) in Paris might suggest, 
results  have  been  less  impressive  in  the  tertiary 
sector,  which  nevertheless  expanded  slightly  less 
rapidly than in the country as  a whole. In the same 
period, population immigration into the Paris region 
showed  a  marked  check,  contrasting  with  its  very 
rapid  expansion  in  the  period  1954-1962.  Outside 
the Paris region major growth-poles  suoh  as  Lyons, 
Grenoble, Marseilles and Toulouse showed high rates 
of growth,  but one  of the most  interesting features 
was  the  vitality  of  many  cities  of  100,000-250,000 
population,  particularly  in  the  outer  Paris  basin 
and  in  southern  France.  This  seems  to indicate  a 
reversal  of  the  long  process  by  which  provincial 
France outside  Paris  became  a  kind  of desert. 
Yet too much should not be attributed to govern-
ment  policy,  even  in  so  centralized  a  country  as 
France. Studies in Germany have shown how in the 
1950s  new  industrial development was  heavily con-
centrated in the agglomerations, but than since that 
time the agglomeration fringes and the medium-term 
towns have been favoured, even without government 
direction.  These  trends  are  reflected  in  population 
change. In the period 1950-1956 the central parts of 
the  agglomerations  were  recovering  their  wartime 
population losses at the expense of the surrounding 
rural fringe. Since 1961  growth in the agglomeration 
cores has slackened, even reversed. Migrant streams 
both from the urban cores and from the rural areas 
have  converged  on  the  rural  fringes  of  the  cities, 
which  have  experienced  rapid growth,  thus tending 
to extend the influence  of urbanism further out into 
the  countryside.  The  medium-sized  agglomerations 
of  80,000  population  and  above  have  also  grown 
rapidly, but really small towns much less, since they 
are not attractive to industry unless close to the facili-
ties  of  larger  agglomerations,  in  which  case  their 
growth is often rapid. Under the rather decentralized 
decision-making  system  of western  Germany,  as  in 
the more closely  planned  conditions  of France and 
for that matter the UK, a period of massive develop-
ment of the great cities in the first 15 years after the war 
appears to have been followed  by some measure of 
diffusion of industry and population to their fringes. 
and to the medium-sized  agglomerations  beyond. 
(to be continued) European  Studies,  10,  1970 
Regional  policy 
in  the  European  Community 
The article  "Regional problems in Britain and the  EEC" (European  Studies 
teachers'  Series  No.  9)  described  the  three  types of problem-region  found  in  the 
seven countries; they were  frontier  regions,  declining  industrial regions and back-
ward  agricultural  regions.  These  represent  one  half  of  the  "problem",  for  the 
social and economic attractions of the crowded more prosperous urban areas  are 
the  root  cause.  Policies  to  relieve  the  over-crowding  of urban  areas  are  linked 
to those for  the revitalization of declining areas,  but we shall limit ourselves here 
to a review of some of the methods and institutions for  the promotion of regional 
growth  in  the  latter  type.  National  governments  have  established  a  number  of 
different  institutions  to  implement  regional  policies;  the  variety  of  institutions 
presents problems of coordination for  the Commission of the EEC. 
Since  1945  western  European  governments  have 
paid increasing attention to regional problems within 
their frontiers. Post-war industrial expansion and the 
participation  of  government  in industrial,  commer-
cial and social sectors of their national life are two 
of the  dominant trends  within which  regional  poli-
cies have developed. 
To  create  wealth  and  allocate  it  justly  is  the 
fundamental national economic problem. To achieve 
maximum  success  in  solving  the  problem  govern-
ments  have  devised  national  plans;  constituents  of 
national  plans  are  attempts  to establish  a  balance 
between more developed and less developed regions. 
Clearly,  underprivileged  communities  cannot  be 
tolerated for humanitarian and political reasons, and 
yet underused manpower, capital and natural resour-
ces are viewed critically as  a drain on social welfare 
and other services. 
The planning process 
There  are  three  major  stages  in  the  process  of 
regional planning. 
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Firstly,  the  regional  problems  must  be  carefully 
defined; a thorough analysis of problem regions must 
be  undertaken. 
Secondly, a policy must be determined which will 
provide  solutions  for  the problems. 
Thirdly,  institutions  must  be  established,  with 
adequate  resources,  such  as  finance  and personnel, 
to  effect  the  solutions  stated in the  previous  stage. 
A statement of regional problems includes accurate 
data on productivity, employment, population trends, 
transport, housing and social services provision. Pro-
posed  solutions  to  the  defined  problems  include 
financial  incentives  to entrepreneurs, local,  national 
and  foreign  (including  capital  grants,  cheap  loans, 
tax  relief  and  the  cost  of  vocational  training  for 
workers),  and the improvement of a  region's  infra-
structure, e.g. provision of electricity, water, housing, 
educational  and  other social  facilities. 
In Britain and the Six there are significant differ-
ences  in  the  ways  in  which  policies  have  been 
implemented to  solve  problems which have  similar 
characteristics  in  the  seven  countries.  To  indicate these differences  and the reasons for them we  shall 
examine France and Italy. In later issues of European 
Studies it is planned to publish case studies of regions 
within  these  countries,  and  others,  and  these  will 
supplement the comments made here. 
FRANCE 
The centralist tradition 
For a  historian, regional  planning in France is  a 
tale  of ironies, where  the regional  reform  proposed 
under  the  referendum  of  April  1969  attempted  to 
reproduce  an administrative struoture similar to the 
one  Louis XVI was  making under the Ancien  Re-
gime:  and while  the  "region" throughout the nine-
teenth centuries belonged to the dogmas of the Right. 
it is now part of the platform of the Left and the Rad-
icals. At the time of the Revolution, France was the 
largest  country  in  W.  Europe  with  a  population 
three  times  the  size  of  the  s~econd largest  country 
which was Great Britain. To administer the country 
Louis  XVI  had  wished  ~to  suppress  the  existing 
feudal patchwork of local parliaments and privileges 
by instituting regional administration throughout the 
country,  supervis,ed  by a  representative  of  the  king 
and with a repres,entative of the social groups at this 
level. The £act that counter-revolutionary movements 
often  had a  regional  flavour,  led  to  the  institution 
with  the  Revolution  of  the  sys~tem of  89  departe-
ments, which covered a smaller area than the region 
and where the level of local democracy, the commune 
(38,000  in number)  was  submitted  to  a  strict  sur-
veillance  and dependence  on  Paris.  The unification 
which  the  Revolution  brought,  abolished  internal 
barriers to  trade and  crea~ted a large market.  These 
changes contributed to the breakdown of the peasant 
society and the concentration of industry and urbani-
sation  in  Paris  and  a  few  regional  centres  which 
thrived  on a  labour  force  leaving  the  countryside. 
Hence,  over  the  last  century,  only  20  of  the  90 
departements  experienced  a  rise  in  population  and 
certain of them  now have less  than one-half of the 
population they supported in 1850. 
The reforms 
The efforts  of successive  governments  since  1945 
have attempted to reverse this distribution of popula-
tion  and  industry,  which  forms  Paris  et  le  desert 
franrais. 
Like the "development areas" in Britain, the pri-
mary object of French policy towards backward re-
gions has been to delineate ~their extent, and to dhannel 
resources  into  the  areas  by  limiting  developments 
elsewhere.  Hence,  in  1955  controls  on  industrial 
development (later extended to offices) in Paris were 
introduced, accompanied by the setting up of "Zornes 
de  Conversion"  in both  declining  industrial  and in 
backward  agricultural  areas.  Funds  were  provided 
by the Treasury to finance public investment in these 
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areas, in the form of financial incentives to industry 
or the improvement of infrastructure. Regional dev-
elopment corporations were  set  up  to  attract addi-
tional  capital,  often  combining  public  and  private 
capital for  large  infras~tructure schemes  such  as  the 
canal  and  irrigation  scheme  for  the  lower  Rhone 
and  Languedoc.  In  1966  it  was  announced  that 
attempts to remedy the maldistribution of population 
would  be  made  through  a  policy  favouring  the 
expansion of eight regional metropolitan centres. 
Such  a  series  of  measures  for  the  revitalis·ation 
of backward regions  takes  its  place  in  the general 
government  policies  for  economic  growth  and  the 
improvement of conditions of life for the population. 
In  France,  the  instruments  described  above  cannot 
be  separated from  the  national  Plan for  the  whole 
economy,  which  has  dictated  the  evolution  of  the 
poLicy  for  backward areas. 
Organisation  of regional  institutions 
As a development of the National Economic Plan, 
provision was made in 1955 for regional plans to be 
drawn up by groups  interes,ted  in  the  expansion  of 
their  region  (Comites  d'expansion).  This  initial  at-
tempt  at the  articulation  of local  interests  quickly 
changed  in  orientation.  however.  and  a  uniformity 
was imposed. which  (some  would  argue)  served the 
needs  of the  national administration in Paris rather 
than the needs  of local  democracy.  In 1956  France 
was divided into 21  planning regions which grouped 
together the departements (i.e.  the State administra-
tion)  and  which  had  little  economic  rationaJi.ty. 
Shortly  after.  r:egional  administ.ra~tive  conferences 
were established to coordinate the work of the prov-
incial  services  of  the  national  m,inistries  and  in 
1964. the post of regional prefect (the senior govern-
ment  official  in  the  region),  was  created.  A  new 
body,  the  Commission  de  developpement  economi-
que regional (CODER). representing the major social 
and economic interests, was given a consultative role, 
taking the place of the earlier "Comite d'Expansion". 
The present situation,  then, is  transitional.  There 
can  be  Httle  doubt  that  the  regionalisation  of  the 
budget  of  the  Plan,  on  the  basis  of  the  regional 
plans.  has  defined  the  problem  which  backward 
regions  pose  for  the  allocation  of  .public  money. 
However, many ques,tions remain of a technical and 
constitutional  nature.  On  the  one  hand  there  are 
many doubts  about the relevance  of the regions  at 
presently drawn to the evolution and character of an 
urban society. and on the other any further regional-
isation  will  rais.e  the  question  of  elected  regional 
governments.  Under de Gaulle presidency,  the  gov-
ernment  put  forward  plans  for  regional  reforms 
which  would  have  involved  the  direct  elections  of 
regional parliaments. These proposals  were  rejected 
in  the  referendum  of  April  1969  but  this  resuH 
should be regarded more as a vote of non-confidence 
in  General de Gaulle (which subsequently resigned) 
than  as  a  rejection  of  the  regional  reforms.  The present French government put forward  at the  end 
of  1970  amended proposals which are still  tlhe  sub-
ject of heated controversy. 
ITALY 
Since  unification  in  1870  national  governments 
have  tried  to  forge  a  national  identity  for  Italy, 
while protecting and perpetuating regional differences. 
For a number of reasons comparative advantage has 
enriched  the  industrial  cities  of  the  north and  im-
poverished  the  agricultural  settlements  of  the 
south. 
The institutions:  the  1948 Constitution 
The  Constitution  stated  that Italy  "was  divided 
into regions, provinces and communes". There were 
nineteen  regions.  Five  of  these,  Sardinia,  Sicily, 
Alto-Adige, Val d'Aosta and Friuli-Venezia- Jiulia, 
comprised  regions  which  had a  historic  unity  of  a 
linguistic or social nature  and these were  described 
as  regions  of "special statute".  While  the Constitu-
tion  authorised  all  regions  to  legislate  on  such 
matters  as  police,  health  and  hospitals,  vocational 
training, town planning, tourism, agriculture, fishing 
and forestry,  regional bus services,  roads  and other 
public  works  of  regional  scope,  the  special  statute 
regions  were  given  greater  powers  in  accordance 
with  their  special  autonomy. 
The  Constitution  provided  for  regional  govern-
ments,  comprising  a  legislature  (regional  council) 
elected by universal suffrage, with an executive body 
called  a  Junta, headed  by a  President,  these  latter 
being  elected  from  the  regional  council.  In  order 
to fulfil their role the regions would be given control 
of  certain  taxes  and  would  receive  quotas  from 
national  taxes.  To ensure  that  the  regions  neither 
exceed  their  competences  nor  act  contrary  to  the 
Constitution there  is  provision  for  a  resident com-
missioner,  in each region,  representing  the national 
government.  Finally,  the  Constitution  provided  for 
the election of the regional council within one  year 
and  the  adjustment  of  the  laws  of  the  republic 
to  the needs of local autonomy after three years.  In 
fact, until  1970, only the regional councils of special 
statute had been elected. 
Development of the South 
With the exceptions  of  Sicily  and Sardinia these 
"constitutional  regions"  have  played  little  part  in 
formulating  policies  for  backward  "economic  re-
gions". The major project for assisting the  develop-
ment  of  the  Mezzogiorno  (the  Italian  South  and 
the  Islands)  has  been  planned  by  the  Cassa  per 
il Mezzogiorno and the Committee of Ministers for 
the  South.  Although  special  government funds  had 
been directed to the South since 1947 the first radical 
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step  was  taken in 1950  with the  foundation  of the 
Cas  sa. 
Cassa  per il Mezzogiorno 
Given  an initial  budget  of  1 000  billion  lira  for 
a  ten-year  period,  the  Cassa  was  established,  after 
much political controversy, as a public development 
agency (  cf. the Scottish Highlands and Islands Deve-
lopment  Board)  working  alongside  the  existing 
central and local authorities. In by-passing the exist-
ing agencies  traditionally competent in this field  the 
Cassa was intended to act more speedily with more 
flexible  procedures. 
It was argued that the Mezzogiorno corresponded 
to  an  economic  rather  than  to  an  administrative 
reality,  and the  planned economic  development  re-
quired a  long-term  treatment,  for which short-term 
constraints  made  existing  administrative  agencies 
unsuitable.  Further,  it was  argued  that  a  plan  of 
extraordinary public works required a single manage-
ment for its execution. 
From the outset the role of the Cassa was limited 
to the provision of public works, principally to im-
provements  in  agriculture  and  the  infrastructure. 
Committee of Ministers 
An extra innovation  in the  policy  for  the  South 
came  in  1957  with the  setting  up of  a  Committee 
of  Ministers  for  the  South.  This  Committee  had 
the  responsibility  of  coordinating  the  activities  of 
all  ministries  active  in  the  Mezzogiorno.  Until this 
time  public  policy  focused  on  the  provision  of  an 
infrastructure as  a pre-requisite for industrialization. 
Now policy became more concerned with industrial-
ization itself. Italian public corporations were requir-
ed  to  place  60  per cent  of  all  new  investments  in 
the South. Additional financial incentives to industry 
were made and these sought to concentrate new in-
dustry  in particular  growth  areas.  The  last  major 
change came in 1965 when a five-year plan for coor-
dination  of all  public investment  in the South was 
instituted. 
Regional policies were part of the Italian five-year 
National  Economic  Development  Programme  pub-
lished  in  1962.  It was  intended that administrative 
regions should play an active part in its formulation. 
Thus the National Commission for Economic Plann-
ing,  the  body  charged  with  formulating  the  plan, 
included  in  its  consultations  the  Presidents  of the 
special statute regions. For each of the other regions 
a regional economic planning committee was created, 
but these new organizations will be temporary given 
the fact that the regions of ordinary statute have now 
elected their regional councils. 
EUROPE AND REGIONAL POLICY 
Regionalisation is  then very  much a live issue in 
France  and  Italy  today,  and  the  same  is  true  in 
most  of  the  other European  Community  countries, which  we  hope  to  discuss  later  in  this  Series.  In 
Britain too,  regionalisation  is  a  controversial  issue. 
The  Maud  Commission  on  Local  Government  in 
England and Wales  reported  in  1970  in favour  of 
a  new  local  government  structure  based  on  much 
larger areas than at present, tlhough it seems unlikely 
that  the  present  government  will  accept  these  rec-
ommendations.  And  of  course  the  report  of  the 
Commission on the Constitution is still awaited, and 
this  also  may  well  propose  changes  of  a  regional 
nature. Indeed in nearly all the countries concerned. 
there seems to be a trend in favour of greater decen-
tralisation  and  regional  involvement.  parallel  with 
a growing acceptance over recent years that regional 
development in the  economic  sense  must  be  given 
a higher priority in national policy making. 
European  Communities'  role 
Decisions concerning the structure of regional and 
local  government  belong  of  course  to  the  national 
authorities,  and  the  European  Community  has  no 
say  in  tJhem.  It  does  however  have  a  very  great 
interest in the  eonomic development of the  regions. 
The Community Treaties do not specificaiJy provide 
for  the  adoption  of  common  polides  nor  give  the 
Community institutions specific powers  in  this  field. 
Nevertheless, they stress frequently  the need  to help 
the  poorer  regions,  and  for  this  purpose  permit 
many  exceptions  to  the  Community's  rules.  For 
example  the  EEC Treaty  lists  among  its  principal 
aims  "to  ensure  the  harmonious  development  (of 
the  member  countries'  economies)  by  reducring  the 
differences existing between the various regions and 
by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured". 
Thus it is that the Community's rules on agriculture, 
fair  competition,  state  ruids  to  industry  and  so  on 
all allow exceptions in the interest of the development 
areas,  and  the  Community  has  often  not  merely 
permitted but positively  encouraged  regional  grants 
and incentives. 
Regional  development  is  however  essentially  in 
the hands of the national governm·ents, and the Com-
munity  can  at  the  moment  do  little  more  tlhan 
exhort,  attempt  to  coordinate,  and  provide  certain 
financial  incentives.  It  has  a  number  of  financial 
agencies which can help here. 
The European  Social  Fund,  set  up by the  EEC 
Treaty to provide money to retrain redundant work-
ers for new jobs is not specifically an instrument of 
regional aid, but inevitably mos.t  of the £15 mHlion 
or  so  it  is  now  spending  annually  goes  to  the 
Community's problem regions. In 1970 it was agreed 
to expand the Fund considerably and  the Commission 
hopes  it  will  in  future  be  able  to  spend  up  to 
£100 million each year. 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
has  its  own  similar  fund  which  spends  some  £10 
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million a year on helping coal and steel workers, and 
has played a particularly important part in smootlh-
ing  over  the  run-down of parts  of the  coal-mining 
industry, in decline in the Community as in Britain. 
The ECSC has also been able to use its substantial 
funds  to  encourage other industries into coal-mining 
areas. 
The  European  Investment  Bank,  set  up  under 
the  EEC  Treaty,  provides  funds  for  development 
operations  and the majority of its loans  have been 
for  projects  in  the  less-favoured  regions.  And the 
Guidance  Section  of  the  EAGGF  provides  funds 
for  agricultural modernisation. 
The Commission has been  urging for some years 
that the  six  governments  should do  much more to 
coordinate  their  regional  development  policies.  It 
put forward  a  first  memorandum in  1965,  bUJt  the 
governments  took  no action.  The Commiss1ion  did 
however  in  that  same  year  commission  a  special 
survey  of  industrialisation  prospects  for  the  Bari-
Taranto area  in Southern  Italy,  whidh  was  subse-
quently designated as the first European development 
pole. A detailed scheme was worked out and  putto1he 
Italian  government  which  undertook  to  implement 
it, with  ~he financial help of the various Community 
agencies. 
In  1969  the  Commission  put  forward  another 
regional  policy  memorandum,  including  specific 
proposals for i)  an annual review by the Commission 
and the governments of the Six on those areas which 
required development plans. The Commission would 
make  recommendations  so  as  to  fit  the  plans  into 
overall Communi,ty policy; ii) a permanent committee 
on  regional  development  where  member  countries' 
development  po1icies  would  be discussed  regularly; 
and  iii)  a  Community  regional  development  fund 
which  could stimulate investment in problem areas 
by providing loan guarantees and interest rebates. 
The governments have not yet approved the Com-
mission's  proposals,  modest  as  tlhey  are.  But there 
is  now  a  growing  acceptance  of  the  need  for 
effective  and  coordinated regional  polkies  for  rea-
sons  of  both  social  justice  and economic  common 
sense.  At the moment some of the six governments 
are  pursuing  regional  policies  which  are  not  just 
uncoordinated,  but quite  contradictory.  These  pol-
icies  tor  instance  often  encourage  companies  to 
build new  plant on whichever side of a fronfi.er  the 
greatest financial help is available, rather than where 
the  greates1t  need ·exists.  And even  more  important 
for the Community, it is becoming clear that witlhout 
effective  regional  action  progress  will  be  blocked 
or hindered in many other vital fields  such as  agri-
cultural  reform,  industrial  modernisation,  social 
policy  and  above  all  the  move  from  the  existing 
customs union towards a real economic and monetary 
union.  These  will  not be politically  acceptable, or 
economically workable, if the interests of the weaker-
parts of the Community are not safeguarded. lOU 
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